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THE STAKES ARE HIGH: THE PROFESSIONAL AND 
AMATEUR SPORTS PROTECTION ACT IS 




Sports gambling is ubiquitous, despite the fact that gambling is 
illegal virtually everywhere.  In 2015 alone, $4.2 billion was legally 
wagered through Nevada’s sportsbooks.1  Although this number may 
seem high, it pales in comparison to the conservative estimate of $150 
billion illegally wagered on sports in the United States (“U.S.”) that 
year.2  Sports wagering was legal in the U.S. until Congress passed the 
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (“PASPA”), 
prohibiting state-sanctioned sports wagering in almost all States and 
driving the popularity of sports wagering to the black market.3 
Professional and amateur sports have long been considered 
America’s pastime, and they continue to increase in popularity every 
 
*Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, J.D. Candidate 2018; Fairfield University, 
B.A., in Psychology, minor in Sociology, 2013.  I would like to thank my notes editor Jessica 
Vogele, Professor Eileen Kaufman, and Professor Rena Seplowitz as this Note would not have 
been possible without them.  I would like to thank Jessica for her advice, guidance, patience, 
and dedication to my success throughout this writing process; Professor Eileen Kaufman for 
her invaluable comments, recommendations, insight, and guidance through the intricacies of 
this constitutional area; and Professor Rena Seplowitz for her advice, support, and guidance 
throughout the editing process. 
1 Dustin Gouker, Nevada Sportsbooks Took Record $4.2 Billion in Wagers in 2015, LEGAL 
SPORTS REPORT (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/7902/nevada-record-sports-
betting-2015/.  Nevada is the only state allowed to offer single game wagering.  
2 Memorandum from Am. Gaming Ass’n to President-elect Donald J. Trump Transition 
Team (Dec. 2016), 
https://www.americangaming.org/sites/default/files/FINAL_AGAMemo_TrumpTransitionT
eam.pdf. 
3 28 U.S.C.A. § 3702 (1992); Am. Gaming Ass’n, supra note 2.  Delaware, Montana, 
Oregon, and Nevada are grandfathered in under a PASPA exception. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 
3704(a) (1992). 
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year.4  Research conducted in 2015 revealed that 67% of U.S. adults 
follow at least one sport.5  However, professional football is America’s 
favorite, evidenced by the fact that National Football League (“NFL”) 
games garnered the top 43 of 50 spots for viewership out of all 
televised sporting events in 2015.6  The American Gaming Association 
estimated that of the $90 billion wagered on NFL and college football 
games during the 2016 season, $88 billion (98%) was wagered 
illegally.7  Although these estimates are not precise, due to obvious 
legality concerns, it is likely that the increased popularity of watching 
sports correlates with the growth in illegal sports wagering.  In 
addition, the prohibition against sports wagering through PASPA 
drives a thriving gambling black market—the revenue of which is used 
to fund “criminal enterprises involved in human trafficking, 
racketeering, money laundering, extortion, and fraud.”8  There is 
clearly a need to regulate the sports wagering market. 
Part II of this Note provides a background of the applicable 
constitutional laws that led to the enactment of PASPA, a description 
of its legislative history, and its resulting enforcement.  Part III focuses 
on a series of cases decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit called Christie I,9 Christie II,10 and Christie III,11 involving the 
constitutionality of PASPA.  Part IV discusses the constitutionality of 
PASPA and concludes that PASPA is unconstitutional because it 
commandeers the States in violation of the Tenth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution. 
Next, Part V discusses the policy concerns surrounding sports 
wagering and why it should be legal.  This part describes the self-
 
4 Pro Football is Still America’s Favorite Sports, THE HARRIS POLL (Jan. 26, 2016), 
http://www.theharrispoll.com/sports/Americas_Fav_Sport_2016.html.  
5 Id. 
6 Paulsen, 2015 Ratings Wrap: NFL Dominates Year of Milestones, SPORTS MEDIA WATCH 
(Jan. 3, 2016), http://www.sportsmediawatch.com/2016/01/most-watched-sporting-events-
2015-nfl-college-football-basketball-nba-womens-world-cup-viewership/. 
7 Press Release, Am. Gaming Ass’n, UK Experts: Thriving Illegal Market and Lack of 
Regulation Create Atmosphere Ripe for Manipulation (Sept. 27, 2016), 
https://www.americangaming.org/newsroom/press-releasess/uk-experts-thriving-illegal-
market-and-lack-regulation-create-atmosphere.  
8 Am. Gaming Ass’n, supra note 2. 
9 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013). 
10 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 799 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2015), 
reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Oct. 14, 2015), on reh’g en banc, 832 F.3d 389 (3d 
Cir. 2016). 
11 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 832 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2016). 
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defeating purpose of PASPA, the legality of fantasy sports, the public’s 
generally accepting view of gambling, the effect of PASPA on the 
black market, and the impact that technological advances have had on 
sports wagering.  Finally, Part VI concludes that PASPA should be 
repealed because it is unconstitutional and reflects outdated policy. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The United States Constitution and Federalism 
After the American Revolution, the Founders, wanting to 
prevent tyranny associated with the concentration of power in a 
national government, established federalism—the division of power 
between the federal and state governments—as the backbone of the 
U.S.12  Congress governs according to its enumerated powers, which 
is intended to limit the federal government’s powers.  Congress derives 
its enumerated powers specifically from Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. 
Constitution, which includes, inter alia, the “Power to lay and collect 
Taxes;”13 “raise and support Armies;”14 “establish Post Offices and 
post Roads;”15 “borrow Money on the credit of the United States;”16 
and “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several 
States, and with the Indian Tribes.”17  While Congress is given great 
deference in the enforcement of its laws under the necessary and proper 
clause,18 the U.S. Supreme Court’s role is to determine the 
constitutionality of these laws, thereby putting a great check on 
Congress’s power.19  
One of Congress’s most important enumerated powers is its 
power to regulate commerce20 through three broad categories: 1) the 
“channels of interstate commerce; 2) the instrumentalities, or persons 
or things, in interstate commerce; and 3) activities that substantially 
 
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. amend. X; The Founders and Federalism, U.S. 
HISTORY, http://www.ushistory.org/gov/3a.asp (last visited Apr. 1, 2017). 
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
15 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. 
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2. 
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
18 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 324-25 (1819). 
19 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
20 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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affect interstate commerce.”21  Channels of interstate commerce are 
the avenues of travel which include, but are not limited to, railroads, 
highways, waterways, harbors, airports, and bridges,22 while the 
instrumentalities are the vessels used for interstate commerce, such as 
airplanes, boats, and cars.23  However, the third category—activities 
that substantially affect interstate commerce—is most important and 
will be the focus of this Note because it provides the broadest authority 
for Congress to exercise its Commerce Clause power.24  Specifically, 
it allows Congress to regulate purely local activity if that activity is 
“economic” as related to the production, distribution, and consumption 
of commodities and if that activity, when aggregated, has a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce.25  Because Congress is given great 
deference when regulating interstate commerce, “court[s] may 
invalidate legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause only if it is 
clear that there is no rational basis for a congressional finding that the 
regulated activity affects interstate commerce, or that there is no 
reasonable connection between the regulatory means selected and the 
asserted ends.”26 
As provided in the Tenth Amendment, the States have 
presumed sovereign power over all that is not prohibited by the 
Constitution and not delegated to Congress.27  However, under the 
Supremacy Clause, whenever an inconsistency between a federal and 
state law exists, the federal law reigns supreme, so long as that federal 
law is constitutional.28  As such, the Tenth Amendment is an 
embodiment of federalism, as it represents dual sovereignty between 
the States and federal government.29  Where Congress does not have 
the power to regulate, the States do.30  This general governing power 
is known as the States’ “police power,” allowing the States to establish 
 
21 Kelley v. United States, 69 F.3d 1503, 1507 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995)). 
22 29 C.F.R. § 776.29 (2017). 
23 Id. 
24 Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56 (2003). 
25 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125, 128 (1942). 
26 Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1981). 
27 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
28 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”). 
29 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713-14 (1999). 
30 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992). 
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and enforce laws protecting the welfare, safety, and health of the 
public.31  
The Tenth Amendment has been interpreted to prohibit 
Congress from commandeering the States.32  Even though “Congress 
has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or 
prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power to directly compel the States 
to require or prohibit those acts.”33  To clarify, Congress cannot 
“regulate state government’s regulation of interstate commerce.”34  An 
example of the anti-commandeering doctrine is exemplified in the 
Supreme Court’s decision in New York v. United States.35  There, a 
federal statute required States to either provide for radioactive waste 
disposal or take title to waste made within the State’s borders.36  
Otherwise, the States would incur monetary damages.37  The Court 
struck down this statute, holding that while Congress has the authority 
to regulate interstate commerce directly under the Commerce Clause, 
it did not have the authority to control state governments’ regulation 
of interstate commerce of radioactive waste disposal.38   
Congress unconstitutionally commandeers state governments 
if it “impos[es] targeted, affirmative, coercive duties upon state 
legislat[ive] or executive officials.”39  In Printz v. United States,40 the 
Supreme Court struck down the provisions of the Brady Act, a federal 
statute, that commanded state and local authorities to perform 
background checks on individuals seeking to purchase guns.41  The 
Court held that the “Federal Government may neither issue directives 
requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the 
States’ officers,”42 reasoning that the States cannot be forced to 
 
31 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012). 
32 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997). 
33 New York, 505 U.S. at 166. 
34 Id. 
35 505 U.S. 144. 
36 Id. at 144. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 166. 
39 Matthew D. Adler, State Sovereignty and the Anti-Commandeering Cases, 574 ANNALS 
OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 158, 158 (2001). 
40 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
41 Id. at 935. 
42 Id. 
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“absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory 
program”43 and take the blame for possible program defects.44   
In contrast, the Supreme Court held in Reno v. Condon45 that 
the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (“DPPA”), “which 
establish[ed] a regulatory scheme that restrict[ed] the States’ ability to 
disclose a driver’s personal information without the driver’s consent,” 
did not violate the Tenth Amendment.46  Even though the DPPA 
required time and effort on the part of state employees to learn and 
execute the system,47 the Court distinguished the DPPA from the 
federal statutes in New York and Printz because the DPPA did “not 
require the States in their sovereign capacity to . . . enact any laws or 
regulations, and it d[id] not require state officials to assist in the 
enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals.”48  In 
other words, the DPPA did not require or influence States’ regulation 
of their own citizens, as it instead merely regulated States as owners of 
databases.49  The Court regarded the DPPA as a general applicable law 
because it subjected States to the same federal regulation as private 
parties.50   
In sum, Congress cannot commandeer a State’s legislature or 
control its regulation of private citizens.51  If Congress wants to pass a 
law that governs the manner of private activities, it must provide the 
States with a choice of self-enforcing the federal law or allowing the 
federal government to enforce it instead.52  Because Congress cannot 
dodge accountability for federal policy, it cannot force state action to 
implement a federal policy according to Congress’s instructions.53  
 
43 Id. at 930. 
44 Id. 
45 528 U.S. 141 (2000). 
46 Id. at 141-42. 
47 Id. at 150. 
48 Id. at 151. 
49 Id. 
50 Reno, 528 U.S. at 151 
51 Id.; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992). 
52 New York, 505 U.S. at 145. 
53 Id. at 145-46. 
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B.  PASPA 
PASPA prohibits sports wagering conducted by, or authorized 
under the law of, any State or other governmental entity.54  
Specifically, PASPA states:  
It shall be unlawful for [either] a governmental entity to 
sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or 
authorize by law or compact, or a person to sponsor, 
operate, advertise, or promote, pursuant to the law or 
compact of a governmental entity, a lottery, 
sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering 
scheme based, directly or indirectly … on one or more 
competitive games in which amateur or professional 
athletes participate, or are intended to participate, or on 
one or more performances of such athletes in such 
games.55 
Additionally, it authorizes the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and 
any professional or amateur sports organization to commence a civil 
action for illegal sports wagering,56 allowing them to enforce 
restrictions via injunctive relief against the States.57  
Congress passed PASPA to: 1) stop the spread of sports 
wagering; 2) maintain the integrity of America’s national pastime of 
amateur and professional sports; and 3) reduce the promotion of sports 
wagering among America’s youth.58  The Committee of the Judiciary, 
when voting in favor of enacting PASPA, opined that the “legalization 
of sports gambling would inevitably promote suspicion about 
controversial plays and lead fans to think ‘the fix was in’ whenever 
their team failed to beat the point-spread.”59  The Committee viewed 
sports wagering as a national problem that needed to be stopped before 
it infected every State.60  
However, Congress undermined PASPA’s purpose when it 
carved out exceptions for several States to either continue or enact 
 
54 28 U.S.C.A. § 3702 (1992). 
55 Id. 
56 28 U.S.C.A. § 3703 (1992). 
57 Id. 
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legislation allowing sports wagering.61  Specifically, Congress allowed 
Delaware, Montana, Oregon, and Nevada to retain their respective 
legislation that had already legalized a form of sports wagering.62  
Additionally, Congress carved out a special exception for New 
Jersey,63 allowing it to authorize sports wagering within one year of 
PASPA’s enactment.64  New Jersey was granted this exception to 
provide its voters the opportunity to decide if they wanted to legalize 
sports wagering in Atlantic City casinos.65  However, the exception 
provided that if New Jersey did not pass a statute authorizing sports 
wagering within that one-year period, sports wagering in New Jersey 
would be completely prohibited.66  New Jersey did not seize the 
opportunity to pass its own statute, and thus the window to legally 
enact sports wagering in New Jersey closed.67 
During the pre-enactment hearings, PASPA did not go 
unchallenged.  Iowa Senator Chuck Grassley and the DOJ were the 
biggest opponents of PASPA,68 arguing that the legislation: 1) 
promoted discrimination among the States via the “grandfather” 
clause; 2) lacked justification; and 3) fundamentally restricted the right 
of States to raise revenue to fund critical State programs.69  
Specifically, for the first point, they alleged that PASPA’s grandfather 
provision discriminated against forty-six of the fifty States by allowing 
only Delaware, Montana, Oregon, and Nevada to continue to legally 
operate sports wagering, thus creating a monopoly on the industry.70  
 
61 28 U.S.C.A. § 3704(a) (1992). 
62 Id. 
63 Atlantic City, New Jersey was the only location that could meet the exception provided 
in 28 U.S.C.A. § 3704(a)(3). See Christopher L. Soriano, The Efforts to Legalize Sports Betting 
in New Jersey: A History, N.J. LAWYER MAGAZINE (Apr. 2013), 
http://www.duanemorris.com/articles/static/soriano_njlawyer_0413.pdf. 
64 28 U.S.C.A. § 3704(a)(3) (1992). 
65 138 Cong. Rec. H11756-02, H11757 (1992).  New Jersey was provided this special 
exception based on its extensive role in the gaming industry.  
66 28 U.S.C.A. § 3704(a)(3) (1992). 
67 The New Jersey Senate supported a referendum to amend the state constitution to permit 
the Legislature to authorize sports betting, but strong opposition by New Jersey Senator Bill 
Bradley, PASPA’s sponsor, resulted in the vote never taking place and New Jersey’s grace 
period expired, Soriano. Supra note 63; Joseph F. Sullivan, Gambling Debate Rages Anew 
Over Sports, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 1991), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/20/nyregion/gambling-debate-rages-anew-over-
sports.html.  
68 S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 12 (1991), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3562. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 12-13.  The Senate hearing did not refer to Montana as an exempt state because 
Montana passed its law pertaining to sports wagering after this hearing. 
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For the second point, they argued that the legislation was without merit 
because the grandfather clause defeated the very intent and purpose 
behind enacting PASPA.71  Although PASPA was enacted to prohibit 
sports wagering because it was seen as “evil” and a threat to America’s 
youth and to the integrity of sporting events, the legislation did not ban 
sports wagering in all States but instead merely limited its 
applicability.72  For the third point, the DOJ noted that determinations 
of how to raise revenue have typically been left to the States.73  The 
DOJ was concerned with federalism issues if PASPA was read as 
anything beyond a clarification of current federal law.74  This point led 
to the recent litigation challenging the constitutionality of PASPA.  
III. LEGALITY OF NEW JERSEY’S LAWS UNDER PASPA AND 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PASPA 
Facing a substantial decline in casino and racetrack revenue, 
the New Jersey legislature held public hearings in 2010 to determine 
whether it should amend its Constitution to legalize sports wagering.75  
The New Jersey Senate State Government, Wagering, Tourism, & 
Historic Preservation Committee then approved the amendment by a 
vote of 4-0, with one abstention.76  Following another public hearing, 
the New Jersey Legislature approved the amendment by a 
supermajority,77 and an official ballot was conducted among New 
Jersey citizens in which 64% voted in favor of the amendment.78  In 
2011, as a result of this resounding support, the New Jersey 
Constitution was amended to allow the Legislature to “authorize by 
 
71 Id. at 13-16. 
72 28 U.S.C.A. § 3704 (1992).  
73 S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 13. 
74 Id. 
75 Brief for Appellants Christopher J. Christie, David L. Rebuck, and Frank Zanzuccki at 1, 
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey (No. 13-1715), 2013 WL 1873966, 
at *1; Public Hearing on N.J. Sports Betting Set for Atlantic City, GAMBLING911 (Mar. 31, 
2010), http://www.gambling911.com/gambling-news/public-hearing-nj-sports-betting-set-
atlantic-city-033110.html. 
76 Public Hearing on N.J. Sports Betting Set for Atlantic City, supra note 75.  
77 New Jersey Sports Betting Amendment, Public Question 1 (2011), BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/New_Jersey_Sports_Betting_Amendment,_Public_Question_1_(2011
) (last visited Apr. 2, 2017). 
78 New Jersey County Vote Results for Sports Betting Amendment, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
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law wagering . . .  on the results of any professional, college, or 
amateur sport or athletic event”79 but the constitutional provision was 
narrowly tailored to allow sports wagering only at Atlantic City’s 
casinos and sports gambling houses, and at racetracks within the State 
of New Jersey.80 
Thereafter, in 2012, the New Jersey Legislature enacted the 
“Sports Wagering Law” pursuant to the new provision in New Jersey’s 
Constitution.81  This law provided the New Jersey Legislature with the 
authority to only license sports gambling and sports pools in Atlantic 
City’s casinos and racetracks within New Jersey.82  Sports wagering 
remained prohibited in New Jersey except to the extent that a casino or 
racetrack was authorized by the State.83  Additionally, New Jersey 
passed substantive regulations to actively and closely monitor all 
organizations that were approved for sports wagering under this law.84  
A.  2012 Law: New Jersey District Court 
In August 2012, the National Basketball Association (“NBA”), 
Major League Baseball, the National Collegiate Athletic Association, 
the National Football League (“NFL”), and the National Hockey 
League (“NHL”) (collectively “the Leagues”) exercised their right 
under PASPA and sued New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, New 
Jersey’s Racing Commissioner, and New Jersey’s Director of Gaming 
Enforcement (collectively, “New Jersey”) in the U.S. District Court of 
the District of New Jersey.85  Specifically, they requested an 
injunction, alleging that New Jersey’s new statute violated PASPA.86 
 
79 N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 2(D), (F); Brief for Appellants Christopher J. Christie, David 
L. Rebuck, and Frank Zanzuccki at 13, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New 
Jersey (No. 13-1715), 2013 WL 1873966, at *13. 
80 N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 2(D), (F).  There are some exceptions.  No wager can be placed 
on college games or athletic events that take place in New Jersey or on any game in which a 
New Jersey college team participates. Wagering is limited to individuals who are 21 years or 
older. Id. 
81 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12A–1 to 5:12A-6 (2012), invalidated by Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 See generally N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:69N (2012).  
85 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 553 (D.N.J.), aff’d sub 
nom. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013). 
86 Id. 
10
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Although the DOJ had initially opposed PASPA,87 as the first 
case challenging PASPA’s constitutionality, the DOJ intervened as a 
plaintiff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2403 in January 2013.88  The Plaintiffs 
then moved for summary judgment, advancing their position that 
PASPA is a “permissible exercise of Congress’s power pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause.”89  They 
argued that Congress has the authority under the Commerce Clause to 
regulate wagering because wagering is an activity that has a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce.90  As a result, they reasoned that New 
Jersey’s Sports Wagering Law should be struck down as a violation of 
PASPA.91  In opposition, New Jersey argued that PASPA was 
unconstitutional.92  Specifically, it argued that PASPA violated: 1) the 
Commerce Clause and 2) the Tenth Amendment’s limitations on 
Congress’s powers.93    
The district court ultimately concluded that PASPA was a 
proper exercise of Congress’s commerce power because “Congress 
had a rational basis to conclude that legalized sports betting would 
impact interstate commerce.”94  Furthermore, the court concluded that 
PASPA did not violate the Tenth Amendment because it did not force 
the States to engage in affirmative activity.95  Specifically, the court 
stated that “[n]o action on the part of the States is required in order for 
PASPA to achieve its ends.”96  Therefore, the court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs and permanently enjoined New 
Jersey from enacting the Sports Wagering Law.97  New Jersey 
subsequently appealed.98  
 
87 See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text. 
88 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 553-54. 
89 Id. at 558. 
90 Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n v. Christie (No. 12-cv-04947), 2012 WL 3964728 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2012). 
91 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 554. 
92 Id. at 557. 
93 Id.  New Jersey also argued that PASPA violated the Due Process Clause and Equal 
Protection Clause.  The court concluded Congress had a rational basis to enact PASPA, and 
as such ruled against New Jersey’s Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause claims. 
Id. at 576. 
94 Id. at 560. 
95 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 570-72. 
96 Id. at 572 (emphasis omitted). 
97 Id. at 579. 
98 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208, 217 (3d Cir. 
2013). 
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B.  Christie I 
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in 
what is referred to as Christie I, affirmed the lower court’s decision.99  
Here, New Jersey did not challenge Congress’s ability to directly 
regulate sports wagering under the Commerce Clause but instead 
argued that “PASPA’s operation over the Sports Wagering Law 
violate[d] the anti-commandeering principle” because it prevented 
States from repealing an existing law.100   
The Christie I court began by analyzing the Commerce Clause, 
which grants Congress the ability to “regulate an activity that 
‘substantially affects interstate commerce’ if it ‘arise[s] out of or [is] 
connected with a commercial transaction.’”101  The court first 
determined that wagering—the “engaging in a game for money, 
property, checks, or any representative of value”102—and national 
sports operated by for-profit leagues103 are economic activities.104  
Next, the court reasoned that professional and amateur sports events 
substantially affect interstate commerce because thousands of sports 
teams and clubs operate across the U.S.105  Because wagering follows 
sporting events, wagering also substantially affects interstate 
commerce.106  Therefore, as PASPA seeks to limit both wagering and 
its effect on national sports, the court concluded that these are 
“quintessentially economic” activities that have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce, and thus Congress had a rational basis for 
determining that sports wagering affects interstate commerce.107  
In addressing the constitutionality of PASPA under the anti-
commandeering doctrine, the court in Christie I held that PASPA was 
constitutional because it merely prohibits “the issuance of gambling 
licenses or the affirmative authorization by law of gambling 
schemes”108 and, as such, does not commandeer the States at all.109  
 
99 Id. at 241. 
100 Id. at 227, 232. 
101 Id. at 224 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995)).  
102 Id. at 225 (internal citation omitted).  
103 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 730 F.3d at 225. 
104 Id. at 224-25. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 225. 
108 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 730 F.3d at 232 (internal citation omitted). 
109 Id. 
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Specifically, the court reasoned that when “Congress passes a law that 
operates via the Supremacy Clause to invalidate contrary state laws, it 
is not telling the [S]tates what to do, it is barring them from something 
they want to do.”110  Rather than affirmatively requiring or coercing 
the States to pass laws prohibiting sports wagering, Congress merely 
invalidated state laws that were contrary to PASPA.111   
To distinguish PASPA from the laws struck down in New 
York112 and Printz,113 the court relied, in part, on Reno v. Condon, 
which, as stated above,114 upheld the DPPA because it did not require 
the States to enact laws or regulations or control the manner in which 
States regulate private citizens.115  The court also relied on the Tenth 
Circuit’s decision in Kelley v. United States,116 which upheld the 
constitutionality of an intrastate motor carrier statute because it only 
preempted state law and “did not ‘compel[] the [S]tates to . . . enact[] 
or administer[] a federal regulatory program.’”117  Additionally, the 
court relied on the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
California’s decision in California Dump Truck Owners Ass’n v. 
Davis,118 which upheld the constitutionality of a Federal Aviation 
Administration Authorization Act provision because it told the States 
what not to do and thus did not command the States to affirmatively 
act.119  Based on these three cases, the court in Christie I held that 
PASPA did not commandeer New Jersey’s legislative process because 
“[a]ll that is prohibited is the issuance of gambling ‘license[s]’ or the 
affirmative ‘authoriz[ation] by law’ of gambling schemes.”120  The 
court noted that there is a stark difference between having no law in 
place to govern sports wagering and enacting a law that authorizes 
sports wagering.121  If there was no difference between the two, 
PASPA could be construed as commandeering a State’s legislature by 
 
110 Id. at 230 (emphasis added). 
111 Id. (emphasis added). 
112 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
113 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
114 See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text. 
115 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 730 F.3d at 228-29. 
116 69 F.3d 1503 (10th Cir. 1995). 
117 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 730 F.3d at 230 (quoting Kelley, 69 F.3d at 1510). 
118 172 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (challenging the applicability of a safety 
regulation exception in the FAAA Act as it applied to local municipalities).  
119 Id. at 1304. 
120 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 730 F.3d at 232. 
121 Id. 
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forcing it to enact a law prohibiting sports wagering.122  As a result, the 
court rejected New Jersey’s arguments that PASPA was 
unconstitutional for violating the anti-commandeering doctrine under 
the Tenth Amendment.123   
Additionally, the court disagreed with New Jersey’s argument 
that a repeal of New Jersey’s previous prohibition on sports wagering 
would equate to authorizing the activity.124  The court stated that 
PASPA allows States to repeal laws prohibiting sports in their entirety 
because “having no law in place governing sports wagering is [not] the 
same as authorizing it by law”125 and the “lack of an affirmative 
prohibition . . . does not mean [the activity] is affirmatively authorized 
by law.”126  Therefore, PASPA leaves the States with two choices: 1) 
repeal their sports wagering ban; or 2) keep a complete ban on sports 
wagering.127  In reaching this decision, the court in Christie I stated 
that “it is left up to each [S]tate to decide how much of a law 
enforcement priority it wants to make of sports gambling, or what the 
exact contours of the prohibition will be.”128  New Jersey then appealed 
to the Supreme Court, which denied certiorari.129 
C.  2014 Law: District Court and Christie II 
In response to Christie I, New Jersey enacted a law in 2014 that 
repealed all sports wagering regulations, penalties, and prohibitions as 
applied to casinos and racetracks.130  This law, like the 2012 Sports 
Wagering Law, was designed to allow sports wagering at casinos and 
racetracks.  While the 2012 law permitted New Jersey to regulate and 
authorize which casinos and racetracks were permitted to offer sports 
wagering, the 2014 law removed all government involvement at these 





125 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 730 F.3d at 232. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 233. 
128 Id. 
129 Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014). 
130 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12A-7 (2014) (repealed N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12A–1 to 5:12A–6), 
invalidated by Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 832 F.3d 389, 392 
(3d Cir. 2016). 
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casinos or racetracks.131  In other words, the 2014 law affirmatively 
prohibited sports wagering at all locations and businesses except at 
casinos and racetracks.132  New Jersey relied on Christie I’s holding 
that the “lack of an affirmative prohibition of an activity does not mean 
it is affirmatively authorized by law”133 and thus believed this 2014 
partial repeal law was not in violation of PASPA because it did not 
explicitly authorize sports gambling at casinos and racetracks.134  The 
Leagues challenged this partial repeal by filing suit against New Jersey 
again in district court.135  The district court granted summary judgment 
in favor of the Leagues and issued a permanent injunction against New 
Jersey after concluding that the 2014 partial repeal was preempted by 
PASPA.136  The district court interpreted Christie I as holding that 
PASPA offers only two choices: 1) maintain prohibitions on sports 
wagering; or 2) completely repeal the prohibitions.137  It thereby held 
that a partial repeal results in state-sanctioned sports wagering in 
violation of PASPA.138  
New Jersey subsequently appealed to the Third Circuit, arguing 
that its partial repeal was specifically permitted by Christie I.139   New 
Jersey pointed out that Christie I reasoned that “the lack of an 
affirmative prohibition of an activity does not mean it is affirmatively 
authorized by law.”140  Because the 2014 repeal did not explicitly 
authorize sports wagering at casinos and racetracks but instead simply 
removed the regulations governing these locations, New Jersey alleged 
that this law was not an affirmative authorization of sports wagering 
 
131 Id. (emphasis added).  Additionally, sports wagering was prohibited by anyone under 21 
years old, on games played in New Jersey, or in which a New Jersey team participates. Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208, 232 (3d Cir. 
2013). 
134 § 5:12A-7. 
135 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488, 490-91 (D.N.J. 2014), 
aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 799 F.3d 259 (3d 
Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Oct. 14, 2015), on reh’g en banc, 832 
F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2016), and aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of 
New Jersey, 832 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2016). 
136 Id. at 508. 
137 Id. at 501 (emphasis added). 
138 Id. at 505. 
139 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 799 F.3d 259, 264 (3d Cir. 
2015), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Oct. 14, 2015), on reh’g en banc, 832 F.3d 
389 (3d Cir. 2016). 
140 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208, 232 (3d Cir. 
2013). 
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as prohibited under PASPA.141  The Third Circuit (“Christie II”) 
affirmed the lower court’s decision and held that the 2014 partial repeal 
violated PASPA because it authorized sports gambling.142  New Jersey 
requested a hearing en banc, which was granted.143  
D.  Christie III 
In October 2015, the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated 
Christie II’s decision144 and, in a 9-3 ruling, (“Christie III”) held that 
the partial repeal violated PASPA and PASPA did not violate the 
Tenth Amendment.145  The majority explicitly rejected Christie I’s 
reasoning that a repeal cannot constitute an authorization.146  It further 
concluded that “a [S]tate’s decision to selectively remove a prohibition 
on sports wagering in a manner that permissively channels wagering 
activity to particular locations or operators is, in essence, 
‘authorization’ under PASPA.”147  The court reasoned that New 
Jersey’s 2014 partial repeal, which removed the prohibition only at 
casinos and racetracks, was in fact an authorization of sports wagering 
at these locations.148  Additionally, the court rejected what it 
considered dicta from Christie I’s decision pertaining to a State’s 
options under PASPA.149  In doing so, Christie III refused to identify 
the specific options left to the States under PASPA except to suggest 
that a complete repeal or a partial repeal allowing friends and families 
to make de minimis wagers between themselves may be allowed.150  
 
141 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 799 F.3d at 266. 
142 Id. at 268. 
143 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 832 F.3d 389, 392 (3d Cir. 
2016); The Third Circuit only granted one hearing en banc out of 2,402 appeals, or in other 
words .04% of the time. U.S. Courts of Appeals—Cases Terminated on the Merits After Oral 
Arguments or Submission on Briefs, by Circuit, During the 12-Month Period Ending 
September 30, 2014, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/B10Sep14.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2017).  
144 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 832 F.3d at 392. 
145 Id. at 390. 
146 Id. at 396-97. 
147 Id. at 401. 
148 Id. at 397. 
149 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 832 F.3d at 397.  Christie I stated a State has two options: 
repeal its sports wagering ban or maintain a complete prohibition. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208, 233 (3d Cir. 2013). 
150 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 832 F.3d at 401-02. 
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Christie III rejected New Jersey’s Tenth Amendment 
argument, although for different reasons than articulated in Christie I.  
Specifically, the court in Christie I held that PASPA was constitutional 
because it does not require the States to keep any laws in place,151 while 
the court in Christie III held that PASPA was constitutional because: 
1) it does not present the States with a coercive choice and 2) it does 
not require the States to take any action.152  The court in Christie III 
held that the States are not presented with a coercive choice because 
the States are “afforded sufficient room under PASPA to craft their 
own policies”153 and are “not required to pass laws, to take title to 
anything, to conduct background checks, to expend any funds, or to in 
any way enforce federal law.”154  Additionally, PASPA does not 
require States to take any action because “PASPA does not command 
[S]tates take any affirmative steps.”155  As such, the court upheld 
PASPA’s constitutionality and ruled that the 2014 law violated 
PASPA.156  Therefore, Christie III affirmed the district court’s decision 
granting a permanent injunction.157 
Judge Fuentes, joined by Judge Restrepo, dissented from the 
majority’s holding that New Jersey’s partial repeal is an authorization 
of sports wagering.158  Judge Fuentes stated that PASPA prohibits the 
States from sponsoring, operating, advertising, promoting, licensing, 
or authorizing sports wagering by law or compact.159  As such, he 
stated that “authorization by law . . . cannot merely be inferred, . . . [it] 
requires a specific legislative enactment that affirmatively allows 
[citizens] of th[at] [S]tate to bet on sports.”160  Therefore, the dissent 
contended that the 2014 repeal did not explicitly or implicitly authorize 
sports wagering because it did not affirmatively allow sports 
wagering.161  Rather, New Jersey’s 2014 law merely left casinos and 
racetracks in a state of limbo—they were unregulated because sports 
 
151 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 730 F.3d at 237. 
152 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 832 F.3d at 402. 
153 Id. at 401. 
154 Id. at 402 (quoting Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 730 F.3d at 231). 
155 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 832 F.3d at 402. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. (Fuentes, J., dissenting). 
159 Id. at 403 (Fuentes, J., dissenting). 
160 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 832 F.3d at 403 (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added). 
161 Id. (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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wagering prohibitions were not applicable to them.162  Furthermore, 
pursuant to this partial repeal, New Jersey could not, and did not 
propose to, perform any actions prohibited by PASPA such as 
sponsoring, operating, advertising, promoting, licensing, or 
authorizing by law sports wagering.163  Because having no law in place 
at several locations did not equate to New Jersey’s authorizing sports 
wagering, Judge Fuentes argued that the partial repeal did not violate 
PASPA.164 Judge Fuentes interestingly posed the following 
hypothetical scenario:  
Suppose the State did exactly what the majority 
suggests it could have done: repeal completely its sports 
betting prohibitions.  In that circumstance, sports 
betting could occur anywhere in the State and there 
would be no restrictions as to age, location, or whether 
a bettor could wager on games involving local teams.  
Would the State violate PASPA if it later enacted 
limited restrictions regarding age requirements and 
places where wagering could occur?  Surely no 
conceivable reading of PASPA would preclude a 
[S]tate from restricting sports wagering in this 
scenario.  Yet the 2014 Repeal comes to the same 
result.165  
In essence, Judge Fuentes argued that if a State issued a 
complete repeal allowing sports wagering to be conducted anywhere 
in the State, as the majority inferred is permissible,166 that State would 
not violate PASPA by enacting a law to restrict the age of bettors.167  
He further argued that because New Jersey’s 2014 law achieves the 
same outcome, it too did not violate PASPA.168  
Judge Vanaskie separately dissented based on the Tenth 
Amendment, which, in his view, prohibits PASPA from compelling 
the States to govern private sports wagering activity.169  He criticized 
the majority for “dodg[ing] the inevitable conclusion that PASPA 
 
162 Id. at 405 (Fuentes, J., dissenting). 
163 Id. at 406 (Fuentes, J., dissenting). 
164 Id. at 405 (Fuentes, J., dissenting). 
165 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 832 F.3d at 405 (Fuentes, J., dissenting). 
166 See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
167 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 832 F.3d at 405 (Fuentes, J., dissenting). 
168 Id. (Fuentes, J., dissenting). 
169 Id. at 411 (Vanaskie, J., dissenting). 
18
Touro Law Review, Vol. 33 [2017], No. 3, Art. 24
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss3/24
2017 THE STAKES ARE HIGH 1327 
conscripts the States to prohibit wagering on sports by suggesting that 
some partial repeal of the ban on sports gambling would not be 
tantamount to authorization of gambling.”170  Furthermore, he argued 
that PASPA controls “the manner in which States regulate private 
parties” because the States’ agendas are disregarded and the States 
must regulate their citizens according to Congress’s instruction.171  
Judge Vanaskie viewed Christie III as leaving the State without a 
choice.172  Specifically, while Christie I’s decision gave the States an 
option to repeal, “in whole or in part, existing bans” on sports 
wagering, Judge Vanaskie criticized the majority’s holding in Christie 
III for leaving the States without a choice because a repeal—whether 
in whole or in part—is implicit authorization.173  
Overall, the dissenters argued that, under the majority opinion, 
every state law–except one that completely repeals all sports wagering 
prohibitions–will likely violate PASPA.174  However, in the view of 
this author, the majority in Christie III correctly determined that the 
2014 sports wagering law violates PASPA because it effectively 
permitted gambling at specified locations, albeit subject to certain 
restrictions.175  The majority was correct in reaching this result even 
though the 2014 law on its face did not explicitly authorize sports 
wagering activity.176  The law clearly had an equivalent effect.  
Nonetheless, as explained in Part IV below, the dissent correctly 
concluded that PASPA violates the Tenth Amendment.  
E.  Supreme Court Consideration 
New Jersey’s petition for certiorari is currently pending before 
the U.S. Supreme Court.177   On January 17, 2017,  the Supreme Court 
 
170 Id. at 406 (Vanaskie, J., dissenting). 
171 Id. at 410 (Vanaskie, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).  
172 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 832 F.3d at 411 (Vanaskie, J., dissenting). 
173 Id. (Vanaskie, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).  
174 Id. at 405-06, 411 (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (Vanaskie, J., dissenting); See supra note 150 
and accompanying text. 
175 Sports wagering was prohibited for anyone under 21 years old, on games played in New 
Jersey, or in which a New Jersey team participates. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12A-7 (2014). 
176 As Judge Fuentes argued, New Jersey’s 2014 law, on its face, did not authorize the sports 
wagering because the statute did not affirmatively authorize casinos and racetracks to engage 
in sports wagering activities. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 832 F.3d at 403 (Fuentes, J., 
dissenting). 
177 Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass ‘n, No. 16-476, 2017 WL 160450, at *1 (U.S. 
Jan. 17, 2017). 
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invited the acting U.S. Solicitor General to file a brief “expressing the 
views of the United States.”178  Although the Supreme Court did not 
officially grant a writ of certiorari, its request for the Solicitor 
General’s opinion was a positive sign for New Jersey on a day when 
the Court denied over 130 appeal petitions.179  The Court’s request for 
the Solicitor General’s viewpoint is significant because the Solicitor 
General’s interpretation of the federal statute or request to grant the 
petition will likely have a significant impact on the Court’s decision.180  
Additionally, the eight justices at the time181 would not have requested 
the federal government’s opinion if they did not believe the case was 
significant.  The Solicitor General has not provided an early indication 
of his view on this case; however, considering President Trump is in 
favor of legalizing sports wagering, there may be reason to think that 
the opinion of the Solicitor General will lean in New Jersey’s favor.  
The confirmation of Justice Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court may 
also tilt the scales in favor of New Jersey as Justice Gorsuch has taken 
a strict textualist interpretation of the Constitution182 and seems to 
favor State power over federal power.183  Although the Solicitor 
 
178 Id.; The Solicitor General appears before the Supreme Court on behalf of the United 
States.  At the time of the Supreme Court’s invitation Ian Health Gershengorn was the acting 
U.S. Solicitor General.  Noel Francisco became acting U.S. Solicitor General on January 23, 
2017. See Robert Barnes, Trump Nominates D.C. Lawyer Noel Francisco as Solicitor, THE 
WASH. POST (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/trump-
nominates-dc-lawyer-noel-francisco-as-solicitor-general/2017/03/08/c62b0774-040f-11e7-
b9fa-ed727b644a0b_story.html?utm_term=.7961bfd0b100.  
179 Orders in Pending Cases, U.S. SUPREME COURT (Jan. 17, 2017), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/011717zor_5h26.pdf. 
180 John Brennan, Two Attorneys Explain Significance of U.S. Supreme Court Notice on NJ 
Sports Betting, N. JERSEY (Jan. 17, 2017), 
http://www.northjersey.com/story/news/business/meadowlands-
matters/2017/01/17/supreme-court-nj-sports-betting/96661138/.  
181 At the time of the Supreme Court’s decision, Justice Neil Gorsuch had not yet been 
confirmed as a justice of the Supreme Court.  
182 See, e.g., U.S. v. Law, 572 F. App’x 644, 648 (10th Cir. 2014) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); 
U.S. v. Games-Perez, 667 F.3d 1136, 1143-44 (10th Cir. 2012) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).  As 
a strict texualist, Justice Gorsuch may conclude with Judge Fuentes of the Third Circuit that 
New Jersey’s 2014 law did not violate PASPA by authorizing sports wagering because it did 
not affirmatively allow sports wagering. See supra note 176. 
183 Justice Gorsuch has disagreed with the use of the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, 
which is used to limit a State’s power to regulate interstate commerce when Congress has not 
acted under the Commerce Clause.  Justice Gorsuch has indicated his agreement with Justices 
Scalia and Thomas that the doctrine is “absent from the Constitution’s text and incompatible 
with its structure.” Energy and Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1171 (10th Cir. 2015); 
Kevin Simpson, Neil Gorsuch: Elite Credentials, Conservative Western Roots Land Denver 
Native on SCOTUS List, DENVER POST (Dec. 11, 2016), 
http://www.denverpost.com/2016/12/11/neil-gorsuch-trump-scotus-list/; Eric Citron, 
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General has no deadline to submit a brief, the Solicitor General’s usual 
practice is to file its briefs by May, which, if the petition is granted, 
would result in the Supreme Court hearing oral arguments during its 
2018 term.184  
IV. ANTI-COMMANDEERING DOCTRINE 
The anti-commandeering doctrine under the Tenth 
Amendment provides that Congress does not have the power to either 
commandeer State or local government officials to carry out a federal 
program or compel the States to legislate in a certain way.185  PASPA 
runs afoul of this anti-commandeering principle because Congress is 
burdening the States with the responsibility to prohibit sports 
wagering.  If Congress wants to prohibit sports wagering, it should do 
so directly and not use the States to carry out its will. 
Historically, States have regulated sports wagering pursuant to 
their police power.186  That is to say, States have been able to 
implement their own regulations in the field of gambling subject to 
overarching federal laws.  However, PASPA removes this power from 
the States without preempting the field.187  Pursuant to the Supremacy 
Clause, Congress can choose to preempt the field of sports wagering 
by regulating the field itself.188  But that is not what Congress did.  
Instead, PASPA put the onus on the States.  In doing so, it created the 
same accountability problems that the Court identified in Printz.189  
 
Potential Nominee Profile: Neil Gorsuch, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 13, 2017), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/01/potential-nominee-profile-neil-gorsuch/.  
184 Supreme Court Procedures, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-
courts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/supreme-1 (last 
visited Apr. 4, 2017); Steve Silver, The Supreme Court Just Asked the Trump Administration 
to Weigh in on Legal Sports Betting in New Jersey, VICE SPORTS (Jan. 17, 2017), 
https://sports.vice.com/en_us/highlight/the-supreme-court-just-asked-the-trump-
administration-to-weigh-in-on-legal-sports-betting-in-new-jersey.  
185 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992). 
186 Helton v. Hunt, 330 F.3d 242, 246 (4th Cir. 2003). 
187 When Congress preempts an area of law, the federal law must be applied over any 
conflicting or absent state law in this area. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 
363, 372-73 (2000).  
188 See New York, 505 U.S. at 168. 
189 See supra notes 40-44.  In Printz, the Brady Act raised accountability concerns because 
it required state and local authorities to conduct a background check on gun owners pursuant 
to Congress’s instructions.  Any complaints by a State’s citizens would fall on the State and 
not on Congress, even though the States were solely acting according to Congress’s 
instructions.   
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PASPA raises accountability concerns because State citizens are likely 
to blame the State when it acts to prohibit sports wagering even though 
it is merely doing the bidding of Congress.  If Congress wants to 
prohibit sports wagering, Congress should do so itself and bear the 
political repercussions.  As the Court held in New York, 
“[a]ccountability is thus diminished when, due to federal coercion, 
elected [S]tate officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views 
of the local electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal 
regulation.”190  As PASPA requires the States to govern according to 
Congress’s instructions, without preempting the field or itself acting, 
PASPA violates the principle of federalism under the Tenth 
Amendment. 
Realistically, either a State’s partial or complete repeal of its 
sports prohibition violates PASPA.  While New Jersey was not 
allowed to enact a regulatory scheme permitting sports wagering (e.g., 
2012 law)191 or to partially repeal that law in a way that implicitly 
authorized sports wagering in Atlantic City (e.g., 2014 law),192 the 
Third Circuit suggested that a different sort of partial repeal–one that 
allowed friends and family to make de minimis bets–would be allowed 
because it would not have the “type of authorizing effect” as the 2014 
law.193  The court  refused to specify what other types of partial repeals 
would be authorized under PASPA194 and provided no guidance or 
explanation as to why authorizing bets among friends and family 
would be permissible under PASPA while authorizing some gambling 
at casinos and racetracks was prohibited.195  The court’s comments 
suggest that the allowable “authorizing effect” of de minimis bets may 
refer to the relatively low value of wagers placed and the informal 
manner of how wagers are placed, but the court failed to provide any 
definitive explanation.196  In this author’s view, there is no basis to 
distinguish de minimis bets from the wagering implicitly authorized 
pursuant to New Jersey’s 2014 law because both types of repeals 
would be geared towards private citizens, and PASPA, in any event, 
carves out no exception based on the amount wagered, who places the 
 
190 New York, 505 U.S. at 169. 
191 See supra Part III, Section B.  
192 See supra Part III, Section D. 
193 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 832 F.3d 389, 402 (3d Cir. 
2016). 
194 Id. 
195 See id. 
196 Id. at 401-02. 
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bet, or the “authorizing effect.”197  Instead, PASPA ensures that a 
private citizen violates state law rather than federal law, even if the 
State does not want a governing sports wagering prohibition. 
Although the majority suggested a complete repeal of a State’s 
prohibitions on sports wagering is permissible,198 this statement is 
difficult to reconcile with the court’s conclusion that a partial repeal is 
an implicit authorization.199  Specifically, a complete repeal 
undermines and is contrary to the goals of PASPA because a State that 
does not prohibit sports wagering by law implicitly allows individuals 
and private entities to conduct sports wagering.  The Third Circuit’s 
decision turned on the effect of the law and not “on the way in which 
the [S]tate has enacted its directive.”200  A complete repeal operates 
the same as a partial repeal (e.g., the 2014 law) because even though a 
complete repeal would lift sports wagering prohibitions for the entire 
state and a partial repeal would lift sports wagering prohibitions only 
in certain areas, the effect of both is to allow sports wagering, which, 
in any event, is prohibited by PASPA.  In other words, allowing sports 
wagering, in any way, is prohibited, no matter the scale.  Thus, any 
repeal–be it partial or complete–of a sports wagering prohibition 
violates PASPA.  
Thus, New Jersey is left with a single choice: maintain a 
complete prohibition.  The Supreme Court has previously held in New 
York201 that forcing the States to legislate in a prescribed way violates 
the Tenth Amendment.202  In that case, the Court struck down the 
federal statute that required States to either provide for radioactive 
waste disposal or take title to waste made within the State’s borders as 
a violation of the Tenth Amendment.203  The Court reasoned that 
“[w]here a federal interest is sufficiently strong to cause Congress to 
legislate, it must do so directly; it may not conscript [S]tate 
governments as its agents.”204  Therefore, when a State is offered a 
choice between two unconstitutional coercive choices, the State is left 
 
197 See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 3702, 3704 (1992). 
198 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 832 F.3d at 401-02. 
199 Id. at 398. 
200 Id. at 397. 
201 See supra notes 35-38. 
202 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 146 (1992). 
203 Id. 
204 Id. at 178. 
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with no choice at all.205  PASPA governs an activity that Congress 
wants to prohibit but gives the States the full burden of enforcing its 
prohibition.  To comply with PASPA, States must leave their 
prohibitions governing sports wagering in effect or potentially forego 
any regulation at all.  Congress, in effect, hijacks New Jersey’s 
Legislature by prohibiting it from partially or completely repealing its 
sports wagering prohibition and forcing it to keep its prohibitions in 
place.  As such, Congress coercively forces the States to act as 
Congress’s agents in violation of the Tenth Amendment principles.   
In contrast, the Supreme Court has upheld federal acts where 
Congress provides States with a choice to either implement a law 
consistent with federal standards or abandon the field entirely, thereby 
allowing Congress to directly regulate the activity.  In Hodel v. 
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc.206 the Court upheld 
the federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, which 
imposed federal environmental protection standards for coal mining.207  
The Court held the Act constitutional because it provided the States 
with a choice to either follow the Act and adopt a coal mining plan 
according to federal standards or allow the “full regulatory burden [to] 
be borne by the Federal Government.”208  The Act did not force the 
States to enact a law but instead created federal regulations within the 
coal mining industry, a preempted field, which the States had a choice 
to adopt or not adopt. 
Additionally, the Supreme Court upheld the Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act (“PURPA”), a federal act, in F.E.R.C. v. 
Mississippi209 because the States had a choice between “abandoning 
regulation of the [energy] field altogether or considering the federal 
standards.”210  PURPA allowed the States’ continued regulation in the 
energy field on the condition that they consider federal standards and 
did not compel the States to enact a legislative program.211  Similar to 
Hodel, the Court noted that Congress could have instead preempted the 
field of energy regulation.212  
 
205 Id. at 146 (providing that States must take title to the waste or regulate pursuant to 
Congress’s direction). 
206 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
207 Id. at 305. 
208 Id. at 288. 
209 456 U.S. 742 (1982). 
210 Id. at 766. 
211 Id. at 765. 
212 Id. at 764-65. 
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The federal acts in both Hodel and F.E.R.C. differ from PASPA 
because the States, under PASPA, do not have a choice to implement 
their own laws consistent with federal standards.  Instead, States are 
directed by the federal government to not authorize or license sports 
gambling in any way.  If a State decides that it no longer wants to 
regulate sports wagering, and it repeals its statute or regulations, that 
State violates PASPA because such a repeal is analogous to an 
authorization of sports wagering.213  Although a State is theoretically 
allowed to issue a complete repeal, as noted earlier, doing so would 
implicitly allow sports wagering to be conducted by any individual 
within the State.214  Akin to a partial repeal, a complete repeal would 
frustrate the central purpose of PASPA.  As such, a complete repeal 
would likely be struck down by the courts as analogous to an 
authorization of sports wagering.    
In rejecting the Tenth Amendment argument, the Third Circuit 
repeatedly relied on Reno v. Condon,215 in which the Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the DPPA.216  However, PASPA is 
distinguishable from the DPPA.  The DPPA was held constitutional 
because it “[d]id not require (1) ‘the States in their sovereign capacity 
to regulate their own citizens,’ (2) ‘the . . . Legislature to enact any 
laws or regulations,’ or (3) ‘state officials to assist in the enforcement 
of federal statutes regulating private individuals.’”217  However, unlike 
the DPPA, PASPA requires States to regulate in their sovereign 
capacity because PASPA prohibits private activity pursuant to state 
law by directing how States must govern their citizens.  Through 
PASPA, States are acting on behalf of Congress, thus violating the first 
and third principles listed above.  In addition, PASPA violates the 
second principle because although the court held that PASPA does not 
require States to pass new laws, it does prevent the States from 
repealing existing laws, which is equivalent to forcing the States to 
 
213 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 832 F.3d 389, 397 (3d Cir. 
2016). 
214 See supra text accompanying notes 191-205. 
215 528 U.S. 141 (2000). 
216 See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 832 F.3d 389, 400-02 
(3d Cir. 2016); see also Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 
208, 228-31, 234-37 (3d Cir. 2013). 
217 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 832 F.3d at 410 (Vanaskie, J., dissenting) (quoting Reno, 
528 U.S. at 151). 
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pass legislation.218  Therefore, PASPA is distinguishable from the 
DPPA with regard to the three principles the Court enunciated and as 
such violates the Tenth Amendment.  
Furthermore, because the federal government regulates sports 
wagering via state law by compelling the States to conform to PASPA, 
PASPA ensures that sports wagering violates state law, not federal law. 
While it is well established that the federal government cannot “seek 
to control or influence the manner in which States regulate private 
parties,”219 the federal government could offer States the choice to 
regulate the private activity according to federal standards or preempt 
state law entirely.220  However, Congress has failed to do either here.  
Because States cannot abandon their regulation of sports 
wagering, as doing so could be seen as authorizing the activity under 
PASPA, they are forced to do the bidding of Congress.  While the 
Third Circuit, in dicta, indicated that not all repeals would amount to 
an authorization it failed to provide any meaningful guidance.221  Even 
though Christie III stated there is an area between a repeal and 
authorization that may be valid, the Third Circuit’s decisions show that 
it is unlikely one can ever be found because any removal of a 
prohibition constitutes government authorization.  
Ultimately, by preventing States from repealing existing laws, 
the court essentially forced States to regulate activities that they may 
desire to leave unregulated.  Christie III refused to equate preventing 
States from repealing laws with forcing a State to legislate, which 
would run afoul of the Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering 
principles.  But, as the dissenting justices found, the decision should 
be seen as forcing New Jersey to govern according to Congress’s 
instructions regarding sports wagering. Viewed that way, PASPA 
violates State sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment. 
 
 
218 Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 646 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring) 
(“[P]reventing the [S]tate from repealing an existing law is no different from forcing it to pass 
a new one; in either case, the [S]tate is being forced to regulate conduct that it prefers to leave 
unregulated.”). 
219 South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514 (1988). 
220 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992); F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 
742, 764-65 (1982). 
221 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 832 F.3d at 401-02. 
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V.   SPORTS WAGERING SHOULD BE LEGAL THROUGHOUT THE U.S. 
A. Public Policy – PASPA No Longer Has a Place in 
the U.S.     
For several decades, many amateur and professional sports 
leagues opposed sports wagering on their games.222  However, in 
recent years, league commissioners, team owners, the casino gambling 
industry, the American Gaming Association, the U.S. Conference of 
Mayors, and the National Council of State Legislatures have been 
much more open to the possibility of legalized sports wagering.223  
President Trump appears to share this sentiment, as he stated in 2015 
that he is comfortable with the idea of sports wagering due to its 
already existing prominence in the black market.224  In February 2017, 
he advised that he wanted the input of the league commissioners, law 
enforcement officials, and other organizations before he would push 
for legalization legislation in Congress.225  It is likely that as public 
opinion becomes more supportive of legalized sports wagering, 
PASPA may be amended or repealed entirely.  
The fear of games being fixed or tainted because of gambling—
one purpose for passing PASPA—has lost its force.  In a 2016 study 
about the Super Bowl, a majority of respondents wanted Congress to 
change America’s current sports wagering laws because they believed 
that “regulat[ing] sports wagering would protect a game’s integrity, 
benefit communities and enhance consumer safety, and increase fan 
 
222 See Will Hobson, Sports Gambling in U.S.: Too Prevalent to Remain Illegal?, THE 
WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/sports-gambling-in-us-
too-prevalent-to-remain-illegal/2015/02/27/f1088e4c-b7d3-11e4-9423-
f3d0a1ec335c_story.html?utm_term=.820a488f551e.  
223 Max Willens, MLB Commisioner Changes Gambling Stance: Federal System A ‘Pretty 
Good Idea’, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.com/mlb-commisioner-
changes-gambling-stance-federal-system-pretty-good-idea-1833046; Tony Batt, NHL Rolls 
the Dice on Las Vegas, GAMBLING COMPLIANCE (June 23, 2016), http://www.becker-
poliakoff.com/webfiles/pdf/Wallach/gamblingcompliance_vegas_hockey_2016-06-23.pdf.; 
Am. Gaming Ass’n, supra note 2. 
224 Highlights From Donald Trump’s Interview on The Herd With Colin Cowherd, FOX 
SPORTS (Nov. 2, 2015), 
http://www.foxsports.com/presspass/latestnews/2015/11/02/presidential-candidate-donald-
trump-on-the-herd; Press Release, White House, Radio Interview of President Trump by Jim 
Gray, Westwood One Sports Radio (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2017/02/05/radio-interview-president-trump-jim-gray-westwood-one-sports-radio.  
225 Fox Sports, supra note 224; White House, supra note 224. 
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engagement.”226  As for sports leagues, the NHL recently approved a 
new team based in Las Vegas that will begin playing in the 2017-2018 
season,227 and the NFL has approved one of its franchises to relocate 
to Las Vegas as early as 2019.228  Placing a sports franchise in Las 
Vegas will permit consumers to legally wager on the participating Las 
Vegas teams.229   
The risk of corruption among games is heightened by the 
illegality of sports wagering, not its legalization, because it is 
impossible to properly determine the kind and the amount of 
suspicious wagering that are altering game lines.230  Additionally, the 
black market of illegal sports gambling drives revenue which criminal 
organizations use to fund “enterprises involv[ing] [] human trafficking, 
racketeering, money laundering, extortion, and fraud.”231  These acts 
of extortion, among other activities, have other criminal and violent 
consequences via collection methods, which involve threats of assault 
or death, assault, murder, kidnapping, and destruction of the debtor’s 
property.232  Speaking at a law enforcement summit in Washington 
D.C. in June 2016, FBI Chief Jay Bartholomew of the Transnational 
Organized Crime Unit acknowledged that the FBI sees the strong ties 
 
226 Howard Stutz, Survey: Americans Want Ability to Legally Wager in the Super Bowl, THE 
MELLMAN GROUP (Feb. 3, 2016), http://mellmangroup.com/survey-americans-want-ability-
to-legally-wager-in-the-super-bowl/.  
227 Batt, supra note 223. 
228 Ken Belson and Victor Mather, Raiders Leaving Oakland Again, This Time for Las 
Vegas, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/27/sports/football/nfl-
oakland-raiders-las-vegas.html?_r=0.  
229 Wagering on individual sports games is legal in Las Vegas, Nevada.  
230 Game lines refers to the point spread, which is the number of points each team has either 
added to or subtracted from its final score for betting purposes. Glossary, PREGAME, 
http://pregame.com/EN/main/sports-betting-basics/glossary/terms/line.html (last visited Apr. 
4, 2017). 
231 Am. Gaming Ass’n, supra note 2. 
232 See generally JAY S. ALBANESE, GAMBLING & ORGANIZED CRIME: AN ANALYSIS OF 
FEDERAL CONVICTIONS IN 2014 (2015), http://stopillegalgambling.org/aga-
assets/uploads/2016/03/Albanese_Illegal_Gambling_OC_Report_2014_cases_FINAL.pdf; 
see also Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Dist. of Mass., Quincy Man 
Sentenced for Running Illegal Gambling Business in Boston’s Chinatown, Using Violence to 
Collect Debts (Mar. 4, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/quincy-man-sentenced-
running-illegal-gambling-business-boston-s-chinatown-using-violence; see also Press 
Release, Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, S. Dist. of N.Y., Manhattan U.S. Attorney 
Charges 46 Leaders, Members, and Associates of Several Organized Crime Families of La 
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that illegal sports wagering has to organized crime.233  Furthermore, 
because online gambling has become prominent in recent years,234 
black market gambling has become much more accessible.  
However, under PASPA, the States cannot develop and enforce 
a regulatory scheme to monitor wagers placed, report unusual line 
movements, set age minimums and verifications, grant licenses for 
sportsbooks, and establish hotlines and agencies for those who have 
gambling addictions.235  As such, PASPA should be replaced with a 
federal regulation providing States with the option to authorize sports 
wagering to maintain the integrity of sporting events and protect 
consumers nationwide. 
B.  PASPA’s Self-Defeating Intent 
The intent of PASPA to prohibit sports wagering was undercut 
in its inception by the statute’s exceptions that permitted several States 
to permit forms of sports wagering.236  Even though the Committee of 
the Judiciary believed sports wagering to be harmful, it voluntarily 
chose to exempt those States that had already enacted a form of 
legalized sports wagering because the Committee did not want to 
threaten those economies already relying on sports wagering.237  
Additionally, a special exception was geared towards New Jersey due 
to its historically unique role in the gambling industry, allowing it to 
join the “grandfathered” States if it passed a law authorizing sports 
wagering within one year of PASPA.238  If PASPA was intended to 
stop the corruptible, immoral activity of “fixing” games, then why 
carve out exceptions for several States to legally operate sports 
wagering at all?  Nonetheless, Congress included exceptions, thus 
 
233 ILLEGAL GAMBLING ADVISORY BOARD, LAW ENFORCEMENT SUMMIT ON ILLEGAL SPORTS 
BETTING: AFTER-ACTION REPORT 9 (2015), 
https://www.americangaming.org/sites/default/files/research_files/After%20Action%20Repo
rt_PDF-Web.pdf. 
234 Walt Bogdanich, James Glanz & Agustin Armendariz, Cash Drops and Keystrokes: The 
Dark Reality of Sports Betting and Daily Fantasy Games, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/10/15/us/sports-betting-daily-fantasy-games-
fanduel-draftkings.html.  
235 See Adam Silver, Legalize and Regulate Sports Betting, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/14/opinion/nba-commissioner-adam-silver-legalize-
sports-betting.html?_r=0.  
236 28 U.S.C.A. § 3704(a) (1992). 
237 S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 8 (1991), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3559. 
238 28 U.S.C.A. § 3704(a)(3). 
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providing a tell-tale sign that sports wagering, even when PASPA was 
enacted in 1992, was not an activity that must be prohibited. 
 
C. Betting on Fantasy Teams Undercuts PASPA’ 
Central Goals 
Although sports wagering is illegal in the majority of States, 
participation in fantasy sports leagues239 is regarded as legal under 
federal law even when monetary compensation is provided to the 
winners.  In fact, the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 
2006, a federal statute, expressly provides an exception for fantasy 
sports.240  Fantasy sports leagues are legal when: 1) the prize offered 
is set in advance of the game and does not depend on the number of 
participants; 2) “[a]ll winning outcomes reflect the relative knowledge 
and skill of the participants and are determined predominantly by 
accumulated statistical results of the performance”241 of the individual 
athletes; and 3) no winning outcome is based on a score, point-spread, 
or performance of any single team, teams, or individual athlete.242  
Practically, this exception allows fans to enter a paid fantasy sports 
league where they construct a fantasy team consisting of several 
athletes, even if the entire fantasy team is composed of athletes from 
the same real-life team.  There is no durational requirement for the 
fantasy sports leagues–a player can participate in a daily, weekly, or 
season-long competition.243  
Although fantasy sports are legal under federal law, there are 
differing views as to their legality among States.244  In most States, 
 
239 Fantasy Sports in this section refers to pay to enter fantasy sports leagues such as 
DraftKings and FanDuel.   
240 31 U.S.C.A. § 5362(E)(IX) (2006). 
241 Id. 
242 Id. 
243 See id. 
244 Many States have launched unsuccessful attacks on daily fantasy sports operators.  
Initially, New York State Attorney General Eric Schneiderman accused daily fantasy sports 
operators of illegal gambling under New York law.  The Attorney General issued cease-and-
desist orders and was granted a temporary injunction against fantasy sports operators.  
However, while an appeal of the injunction was pending, the New York State Legislature 
quickly passed a bill to regulate daily fantasy sports. See Joe Drape, Fantasy Sites DraftKings 
and FanDuel Stop Taking Bets in New York, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/22/sports/football/draftkings-and-fanduel-stop-taking-
bets-in-new-york.html; see also Chris Grove, What are the States Where You Can Play Daily 
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sports fantasy leagues are legal unless three elements are met: 1) 
consideration;245 2) reward;246 and 3) chance.247  The difference 
between fantasy sports and sports wagering is that fantasy sports are 
considered to be a game of strategy and skill while sports wagering is 
often thought to be based on chance, driven by factors beyond a 
participant’s control and not on judgment, practice, or skill.248   
Fantasy sports are primarily based on strategy and skill because 
they involve drafting teams and setting lineups to maximize points, 
even though players may lack familiarity with substantially all of the 
athletes’ statistics.249  Sports wagering is considered a game of chance 
because individual games are a function of myriad factors, such as the 
health and mood of the players and condition of the playing field.250  
However, the distinction between the two is more illusory than the law 
makes it seem.  Weather, illness, injuries, unlucky breaks, and “off 
days” are all factors, among others, that contribute to a player’s 
performance that affect both the individual performer and the team.  As 
such, there is always an element of chance when deciding on the 
outcome of a third party’s performance, regardless if the third party is 
a team or individual athlete.  Paid fantasy sports leagues and sports 
wagering are also similar because they both require risking money to 
partake in the activity, they both involve a commission taken by the 
entity accepting or organizing the game, and they both involve an 
activity whose outcome is uncertain.  The DOJ has similarly argued 
 
Fantasy Sports?, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT, http://www.legalsportsreport.com/daily-fantasy-
sports-blocked-allowed-states/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2017).  
245 Consideration is a performance or promise that is bargained for in exchange of a return 
promise or performance. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (2013).  In the context 
of gambling, most courts have held consideration is providing money or valuable property in 
exchange for greater winnings while some courts hold consideration to be any legal detriment 
even if non-monetary in value. Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Fantasy Sports and the 
Law: How America Regulates its New National Pastime, 3 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 27 
(2012). 
246 A reward is a tangible prize that an individual gets for winning a bet. Edelman, supra 
note 245, at 28. 
247 Erica Buerger, Better to be Good than Lucky: Using Fantasy Sports Strategy to Defend 
the Legal Status of America’s Newest Pastime, TIMELY TECH (Feb. 12, 2013), 
http://illinoisjltp.com/timelytech/better-to-be-good-than-lucky-using-fantasy-sports-strategy-
to-defend-the-legal-status-of-americas-newest-pastime/.  
248 Edelman, supra note 245, at 26-28. 
249 See Why Fantasy Sports is Not Gambling: Understanding a Game of Skill, FANTASY 
SPORTS TRADE ASS’N, http://fsta.org/research/why-fantasy-sports-is-not-gambling/ (last 
visited Apr. 4, 2017). 
250 Nat’l Football League v. Governor of State of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1385 (D. Del. 
1977). 
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that sports wagering involves substantial skill and “sports bettors can 
employ superior knowledge of the games, teams, and players in order 
to exploit odds that do not reflect the true likelihoods of the possible 
outcomes.”251  Since both fantasy sports and sports wagering involve 
elements of chance, skill, and strategy, they should both be governed 
under the same standard, and as such, sports wagering should be 
considered legal.      
VI. CONCLUSION 
Sports wagering, whether legal or illegal, is and will remain a 
fact of life in the United States as amateur and professional sports 
continue to rise in popularity.  PASPA is an outdated law that 
contributes to a thriving underground sports wagering market.  
Because States have no practical options to craft a policy that regulates 
sports wagering, attempts to minimize or eliminate the underground 
market have been unsuccessful.  
Pursuant to the Commerce Clause,252 Congress can regulate 
certain economic activities that have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce when aggregated.253  However, the anti-commandeering 
doctrine under the Tenth Amendment limits Congress’s power by 
prohibiting Congress from directly compelling a State legislature to 
require or prohibit acts contained in federal laws.254  Even though 
Congress can regulate some intrastate activity under the Commerce 
Clause, it cannot regulate a State government’s regulation of these 
activities.255 
Outside of the grandfathered States, PASPA prohibits State 
governments from “sponsor[ing], operat[ing], advertis[ing], 
promot[ing], licens[ing], or authoriz[ing] by law” sports wagering.256  
Although Congress created exceptions for several States to continue 
operating sportsbooks, it intended, by enacting PASPA, to: 1) stop the 
spread of sports gambling; 2) maintain the integrity of America’s 
 
251 Brief for Appellant at 29-30, U.S. v. Discristina, 726 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2013) (No. 12-
3720), 2012 WL 6800562, at *30.  The DOJ argued that the federal law that defines gambling 
includes games of skill, e.g., sports wagering, and therefore, should also include poker, which 
is also a game of skill. Id. 
252 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
253 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). 
254 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992). 
255 Id. 
256 28 U.S.C.A. § 3702 (1992). 
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national pastime, both amateur and professional sports; and 3) reduce 
the promotion of sports gambling among America’s youth.257 
The Third Circuit’s decisions essentially leave the States with 
only one choice: prohibit all sports wagering.  By preventing States 
from repealing their sports wagering laws, PASPA is in essence 
compelling States to enforce federal legislation in violation of the anti-
commandeering doctrine of the Tenth Amendment.  There is no 
accountability by the federal government nor recourse through the 
state political process to change the policy because the States are 
forced to do Congress’s bidding by keeping state prohibitions in place.  
The American public, the President, league commissioners, 
owners of professional teams, and members of the federal government 
all agree that it is time to repeal PASPA and allow all States the 
opportunity to permit sports wagering.258  Regardless of its legality, 
sports wagering is prominent in the U.S. and is currently catering to 
criminal organizations through their operation of underground sports 
wagering services, which jeopardize the integrity of sports and safety 
of the consumer, and remove billions of dollars of tax revenue from 
States and local communities.  It is time for Congress to accept that 
gambling is here to stay and should be brought into the legal realm so 
that it can finally be regulated. 
In conclusion, as a matter of policy, Congress should repeal 
PASPA and enact a new framework that will permit and regulate sports 
wagering effectively.  On constitutional grounds, PASPA should be 
deemed unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment as it compels the 
States, without another alternative, to do Congress’s bidding.  
 
 
257 S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 5 (1991), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3555. 
258 See supra Part V, Section A.  
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